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Cuba's Foreign Policy Apparatus and How It Works

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Cuba's Foreign Policy Apparatus and How It Works

*Central Intelligence Agency
Directorate of Intelligence*

July 1977

Key Judgments

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Cuba's foreign policy is primarily in the hands of Fidel Castro, the members of the party's Political Bureau and Secretariat, and the officials of the party Central Committee's departments. The Foreign Ministry plays only a minor role, if any, in deciding policy options and is primarily an administrative body. The Cuban foreign minister is a legitimate spokesman for the Cuban government, but his duty is to support policy decisions rather than make them.

Some of the key considerations in Cuban foreign policy formulation are:

- Castro's personal prestige in the international arena.
- His perception of Cuba's third world leadership responsibilities.
- The Castro regime's reputation as a truly revolutionary and anti-imperialist administration.
- Havana's cooperative relationship with Moscow and adversary relationship with the US.
- Cuba's economic well-being.
- Domestic reaction in Cuba.

Castro's pre-eminence in the process determining Cuba's foreign policy is not likely to change in the near future, if his good health continues. His power base is secure and will probably remain so for years. Thus, Cuban foreign policy will continue to reflect many of the characteristics of his personality—daring, aggressiveness, and commitment to change.

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It will also continue to display some of the weaknesses that have plagued it since 1959. While Castro is less prone to foolish gambles than in earlier years, his deep commitment to "proletarian internationalism" is likely from time to time to continue to cause him grief. He is beginning to find Angola a quagmire, for example, and may find himself hard pressed to choose between assuaging Cuban public opinion and compromising his revolutionary principles.

In Soviet-related matters, Castro has little maneuverability, and the trend will be toward greater Soviet influence. At the same time, his deeply ingrained suspicion of the US and his need for a scapegoat to justify continued domestic austerity will rule out any dramatic shift in his fundamental attitude toward Washington despite the successes that may be scored in improved relations with the US. Hostility toward the US is likely to remain a basic element of Cuban foreign policy at least until Castro passes from the scene.

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Cuba's Foreign Policy Apparatus and How It Works

Foreign Policy and the Cuban Leadership

Cuban foreign policy has always been largely in the purview of Fidel Castro. He still makes all major policy decisions and probably many of the minor ones as well. He has matured considerably since 1959 and appears less prone to the foreign policy gambles and quick decisions that marked the early days of his administration. In the late 1960s, faced with the growing complexity of Cuba's foreign ties and the realization that his record was not that impressive, he began withdrawing from his practice of depending almost entirely on his political instincts and began to give more attention to advice from other members of the Cuban leadership as well as from experienced foreign leaders and officials.

Moreover, in recent years he has become much less involved in the details of domestic political and economic affairs, leaving him more time for foreign affairs and trips such as his six-week sojourn in March and April 1977. In the first 13 years of his rule, for example, he traveled abroad only five times, visiting seven countries—the USSR twice. Since November 1971, on the other hand, he has taken six trips and visited 24 countries—the USSR and Algeria four times each, Guinea three times, and four other countries twice each. This has given him greater exposure to foreign influences and has helped broaden his understanding of other areas of the world and the role that his country can play in the international community.

Travel to Cuba by foreign leaders has also increased in recent years, strengthening Castro's



President Fidel Castro

personal contacts and further whetting his appetite for an international role. As time goes on, his predilection for the limelight is likely to cause him to devote even more time to international politics than to the less prestigious domestic scene, where tough economic problems remain unsolved. The culmination of his current efforts to achieve center stage will occur in 1979 when the next nonaligned summit meets in Havana. Until then, domestic matters will probably be left primarily to others in the leadership.

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
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Foreign Travel by Fidel Castro
Since January 1959

Travel Dates	Country Visited	Remarks
January 23-27, 1959	Venezuela	
April 16 - May 8, 1959	US and Canada Uruguay, Brazil, and Argentina	April 16-28 April 28 - May 8
September 18-28, 1960	US	Visit to the United Nations
April 27 - June 4, 1963	USSR	
January 13-23, 1964	USSR	
November 10 - December 4, 1971	Chile	Brief stop in Peru and Ecuador on December 4
May 3 - July 5, 1972	Guinea	May 3-8. Few hours in Sierra Leone on May 8
	Algeria Bulgaria Romania Hungary Poland East Germany Czechoslovakia USSR	May 8-17 May 17-26 May 26-30 May 30 - June 6 June 6-13 June 13-21 June 21-26 June 26 - July 5
December 19-24, 1972	Morocco USSR	December 19 December 20-24
		September 2-18, 1973 Guyana Trinidad-Tobago Guinea Algeria Iraq India North and South Vietnam Czechoslovakia February 22 - March 16, 1976 USSR Yugoslavia Bulgaria Algeria Guinea March 1 - April 8, 1977 Algeria Libya South Yemen Somalia Ethiopia South Yemen Tanzania Mozambique Angola Algeria East Germany USSR
		September 2 September 3 September 4 September 5-9 (non-aligned conference) September 10-11 September 11-12 September 12-17 September 17-18 February 22 - March 6 March 6-8 March 8-12 March 12-14 March 14-16 March 1 March 1-10 March 10-12 March 12-14 March 14-16 March 16-17 March 17-21 March 21-23 March 23-31 March 31 - April 2 April 2-4 April 4-8

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This year Castro has visited...

...Brezhnev in April.

...Libyan President Qadhafi in March.



...Tanzanian President Nyerere in March.

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Castro's interest in the third world is not, of course, solely ego-related. He sees an alliance of the "have nots" as the most effective way of gaining concessions from the "haves," and he thus places great stress on expanding Cuba's formal ties throughout the world. Caught in a superpower environment, he pursues alignment with a host of small, "nonaligned" countries as a means of achieving leverage with the US and the USSR. Aware of the weaknesses and rivalries that tend to divide the "have not" nations and dilute the impact of their joint efforts, he strives to provide the vibrant leadership that the nonaligned movement requires to be effective.

He is aware, however, that his credibility is often undercut by other leaders' perceptions of him as a Soviet pawn; yet his domestic economic situation and his desire to retain a counterbalance to the US require him to maintain strong ties to the USSR in spite of the price. The frustration this "puppet" role has brought has pushed Castro toward a bipolar

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concept of international politics in which nations are assigned to only two camps, socialist and imperialist; or more simply stated, those "who are with us and those who are against us." He probably overestimates his ability to maneuver outside the Soviet orbit and seems to have less and less trouble rationalizing his subordination of Cuban foreign policy to that of Moscow.

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Castro thus is a very unlikely candidate for the role of unifier of the nonaligned movement and will probably continue to find himself and Cuba in the ranks of the movement's radicals.

Rating just as high as prestige in Castro's list of personal priorities is his reputation as a revolutionary. He finds distasteful any policy decision that leaves him vulnerable to criticism from the left. When attacked bitterly by a few Latin American guerrilla chieftains for having reduced or withdrawn Cuban assistance in the late 1960s, for example, he reacted with a stinging denunciation of "pseudo-leftists" who had the opportunity to bring about revolutionary change but muffed the chance. He ignored the fact that these critics had undertaken, often at great personal sacrifice, to carry out revolution using the very blueprint he had urged upon them. His acute sensitivity in this area makes it difficult for him to embark on the path of rapprochement with the "imperialist" US; as prospects for normal relations improve, he considers himself under increasing pressure to convince the world's revolutionaries that he has not sold them out. He would rather have his Cubans tighten their belts another notch than give the appearance of having seriously compromised his revolutionary principles for narrow national interests.

Belt-tightening has its limits. The political reality in Cuba, however, is such that Castro, if he chose to do so, could virtually ignore popular sentiment and rule by large-scale repression. There is no organized opposition to challenge him or provide a nucleus around which dissidents could form to offer resistance; in any event, the security forces are strong enough to control anything short of widespread popular disturbances.

Nevertheless, Castro prefers to rule through genuine popular support rather than repression and pays close attention to mass sentiment both through personal contact on trips throughout the country and through the party's public opinion polling apparatus. He was staggered, for example, upon finding in 1970 that public confidence in him had dropped to an all time low.

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Out of respect for public opinion, he has for more than a year and a half withheld from the Cuban people the full story of the Cuban intervention in Angola. Alerted by the negative response of many of the first reservists called upon to volunteer for combat, he has minimized the extent of the Cuban involvement—even to the point of giving the Popular Movement credit for military victories earned by Cuban units—and particularly Cuban casualties. Were he to speak frankly to the Cuban people, revealing the cost in lives and money as well as the projected cost over the coming years, popular reaction might well cause him to alter his policy on Angola.

He has already given clear signs that he realizes there are limits to popular support of his African policy. In an address to a mass gathering in Havana last summer, he implied that a maximum of 3,000 Cuban technicians might be required for service in Angola, a figure far short of the number he was actually planning to send. Apparently in deference to popular fears, he denied that Cuba was depriving itself by its foreign assistance programs, saying, "Let no one think that a people loses something when it helps another." Three months later, in another public address, he minimized Cuban assistance to Sao Tome and Principe.

On the other hand, popular opinion in Cuba is not always a restraining force. The spontaneous reaction of the Cuban masses after the bombing of a Cuban airliner in Barbados last October is a case in point. So widespread was the public's feeling of revulsion and grief that Castro was impelled to react harshly toward the US at a time when he would have preferred to adopt a more moderate stance. As a sop to the public outrage, he announced the cancellation of the bilateral understanding on hijacking. At the same time, however, he quietly postponed indefinitely his plans for an extended television spectacular allegedly revealing US intelligence operations against his regime. He belatedly recognized that the bombing incident, in which 57 Cubans died, had inflamed public opinion to the point where official agitation would have

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resulted in a reaction guaranteed to upset his timetable for improving relations with Washington.

In recognition of its importance, he takes great pains to manipulate both Cuban and world public opinion. To circulate views that he wants to appear in the world—but not the Cuban press—he holds impromptu press conferences with foreign correspondents covering local events or grants private interviews to selected journalists or visiting political figures who can be trusted to “tell all” upon returning home. The news he wants in the Cuban press is fed into the tightly controlled propaganda apparatus, in which he takes considerable personal interest. After delivering a major address, for example, he visits the office of the party daily and personally edits his speech, often even supervising the layout of the newspaper’s coverage of the event. He nevertheless appears to be aware that even his remarkable ability to mold public opinion has its limits.

Castro is very much an activist. Rather than waiting for developments to occur, he prefers to serve as a catalyst, making moves that precipitate reactions. He is a strong proponent of continuing revolution and in fact sees change as a means of maintaining the initiative in international affairs and increasing his foreign policy options. He sees the status quo as a negative factor to be overcome, and his activism has resulted in his promotion of change both at home and abroad.

In constructing the Cuban leadership, he has deliberately surrounded himself largely with loyal comrades-in-arms from his guerrilla days who think much as he does and in some cases are even stronger proponents of continuing revolution than he is. He has thus given a significant leadership role to an element that sees virtue in boldness and interprets caution as indecision and weakness. This element tends to view events and political options in simplistic terms, sometimes failing to appreciate fully the complexities and subtleties of particular political situations or courses of action. It is inclined toward extremes, seeing only black and white where different shadings exist. The strongest

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characteristic of this group, however, is loyalty to Fidel, and it backs him fully once he makes a decision. The group is built around—but not restricted to—Raul Castro, the military establishment, and the security forces of the Interior Ministry.

In contrast, Castro has also brought into the leadership a more sophisticated faction that is less inclined toward radical action and more closely in tune with thinking in Moscow. This faction is more experienced in politics than the loyalist guerrilla faction, has its origins mainly in the pre-Castro Communist party, and owes its present influence in large part to Castro’s need for Soviet support. This faction’s members are generally a generation older than their guerrilla counterparts, some having survived in Cuban politics since the 1930s. Although this “old Communist” faction is small—and growing smaller as its members die off—it has disproportionate power because of its invaluable service as a bridge between Moscow and Havana and its skills in basic political organization in Cuba. Its main spokesmen are party Political Bureau members Carlos Rafael Rodriguez and Blas Roca.

The “old Communist” faction was badly compromised in March 1962 when some of its members attempted to wrest power from Castro by replacing his loyalists in the nascent, post-revolution party structure with long-time Communist militants. Castro reacted quickly and forcefully, and the old Communists were obliged to keep a low profile until the end of the decade when the guerrilla elite was faced with the realization that its policies had brought the country to the brink of political and economic disaster. Since 1970, the old Communists have been increasing their influence gradually, generally serving as a restraining factor on the headstrong loyalist guerrillas and promoting broad institutionalization by which they hope to consolidate their gains.

Gradually gaining influence in the leadership is a third, less well-defined faction made up mainly of technocrats and economists whose main impact on foreign policy stems from their need for foreign goods and technology that can

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spell success or failure in their respective governmental responsibilities. Whereas the loyalist guerrilla faction, for example, views improved ties with the US as threatening Cuba's "ideological purity," the technocrats stress the benefits of US trade and technology in helping to achieve production goals. In this they are aligned with the "old Communists" who want to reduce the economic burden on the USSR. While the technocrats and economists have no recognized spokesmen and rank far behind the loyalist guerrillas and the "old Communists" in the hierarchy, their influence is bound to increase as Cuba's economic problems multiply, the government becomes more institutionalized, and Moscow's patience with Cuban waste and mismanagement wears thin.

Of the three main groups, only the first two are strong enough to challenge each other on major issues. The term factions is perhaps a misnomer because it suggests contentiousness where none—at least on the surface—is now present. The two currently do not seem to have an adversary relationship. Moreover, the "old Communists" are keenly aware of the superiority of the loyalist guerrillas, and they conduct their affairs accordingly. While little is known of their interaction, there is apparently enough give and take to permit the ironing out of differences without occasioning the destructive internecine strife that marked disagreements in the early and mid-1960s. The extremist elements of both factions have been removed over the years, and this has left a more closely knit, smooth-working leadership. When opposing views are irreconcilable, Fidel Castro is the final arbiter, and both factions acknowledge his unquestioned supremacy in the decisionmaking process.

Party Political Bureau

The party's Political Bureau is the highest policymaking body in Cuba—the party having precedence over the government. Although this policymaking function theoretically rests with the Central Committee of the party, in practice it is the Political Bureau that decides—and Fidel Castro dominates the Political Bureau. Presum-

UNCLAS.

The Cuban Communist Party Political Bureau

Fidel Castro, first secretary

Raul Castro, second secretary

Juan Almeida (ex-guerrilla):

Present duties unspecified

Ramiro Valdes (ex-guerrilla):

Supervises all construction activity

Guillermo Garcia (ex-guerrilla):

Supervises transportation and communications

Armando Hart (ex-underground):

Minister of Culture

Pedro Miret (ex-guerrilla):

Party Secretariat official

Jose Ramon Machado Ventura (ex-guerrilla)

Present duties unspecified

Oswaldo Dorticos (ex-underground*):

Present duties unspecified

Sergio del Valle (ex-guerrilla):

Minister of Interior

Carlos Rafael Rodriguez ("old Communist"):

Supervises foreign relations and economic matters

Blas Roca ("old Communist"):

Supervises legal matters; national assembly president

Arnaldo Milian ("old Communist"):

Present duties unspecified

*Linked tenuously to Castro's rebels as well as the "old Communists," Dorticos' primary loyalty lies with Castro.

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ably because it comprises the leadership of the Central Committee, its decisions apparently are considered as having the blessing of the entire committee membership. Thus, much of the Central Committee is left out of the policymaking process on a regular basis.

If, on the other hand, the circumstances of a particular situation indicate to Castro that the appearance of a strong, unified leadership is required, a special session of the Central Committee may be called to reinforce his position. The Central Committee was convened in January 1968, for example, to purge right-wing elements of the "old Communist" faction—a purge undertaken to stress Castro's displeasure with the political and economic pressure Moscow was exerting on him. Fidel and Raul Castro were the main actors in the scenario, but the punitive action itself was carried out under the Central Committee's aegis. Again in July 1972, upon Castro's return from a trip to Eastern Europe and the USSR, the Central Committee

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was convened to issue a resolution underscoring the Cuban leadership's support for Castro's dissatisfaction with certain elements of Soviet foreign policy. Castro looked upon "detente" as selling out to the US, and he believed Moscow was not giving enough support to North Vietnam. The most recent meeting of the Central Committee occurred on June 10 to approve a set of international and domestic policy actions set forth by Castro. In effect, the Central Committee remains little more than a rubber stamp for decisions already made by Castro and the Political Bureau.

In the 13-man Political Bureau itself, only Fidel, Carlos Rafael Rodriguez, and Raul Castro are involved in foreign policy decisions on a regular basis. Others become involved apparently when their specific duties so require or when special circumstances exist. Juan Almeida, for example, is not normally concerned with foreign affairs, but was dispatched on visits to Jamaica, Guyana, Angola, and Congo because he is Cuba's highest ranking black and the occasions of his visits called for emphasis of Cuba's "negritude." Guillermo Garcia, on the

other hand, has gone abroad for meetings dealing with his prime responsibilities: transportation and communications. Both undoubtedly report fully to Fidel upon their return, and thus have some impact on his decisions. They are not known, however, to be prime actors in the foreign policymaking process.

Carlos Rafael Rodriguez, on the other hand, is a key factor in foreign policy decisions and has great influence on Fidel. Rodriguez is highly intelligent and has considerable experience in bilateral negotiations as well as in international forums. Held back in the first decade of Castro's rule because of the "old Communist" guerrilla elite conflict, he has emerged in the past seven years as the most influential of the surviving "old Communists," achieving a seat on the Political Bureau during the party's first congress in December 1975. He is the regime's main go-between in relations with Moscow and since 1972 has served as overseer de jure of Cuba's foreign relations. He is the main architect of the campaign since the late 1960s to bring Cuban foreign policy more into line with that of Moscow.



Carlos Rafael Rodriguez



Raul Castro

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25X1 [] Rodriguez has had some success in bringing the Cuban foreign policy apparatus under his personal control. Late last year he succeeded in replacing maverick Foreign Minister Raul Roa with Isidoro Malmierca, an "old Communist" militant. Roa, a feisty intellectual from the 1930s who did not fit into either the guerrilla or "old Communist" molds, proved too independent for Rodriguez, whereas Malmierca can be expected to work easily with Rodriguez and closely reflect his views. The Foreign Ministry, however, is concerned more with the mechanics of foreign policy than with policy formulation—a task left to the departments of the Central Committee. Rodriguez appears to have less control over the departments.

25X1 [] While Raul Castro for years had concerned himself primarily with domestic matters—creating an effective military establishment and developing the armed forces as a source of leadership for the government—he has in recent times become more involved in international matters. His Armed Forces Ministry provided the bulk of the military personnel sent to Angola and has been sending combat troops, military advisers, and military construction personnel to other countries for years. Raul has traveled abroad on a number of occasions—spending long visits in the USSR—and is probably the adviser Fidel trusts more than anyone else. Although his primary responsibilities remain in the military and security fields, his counsel is sought by Fidel on a broad range of foreign policy matters, particularly those involving Cuba's relations with the USSR and the US.

[] Raul has developed a good relationship with the Soviets []

25X1 [] Raul's relationship with the Soviets is closely tied to his position as armed forces minister; virtually all of the weapons, ammunition, and equipment used by the Cuban armed forces come from the USSR, and all of it,

according to public statements by Fidel and Raul, is supplied free of charge.

25X1 [] Raul has tried to establish close ties with military establishments in Latin America both by personal diplomacy and by inviting foreign delegations to large-scale military maneuvers held in Cuba at year's end. His success has been less than spectacular, however, in part because he apparently is unable to project a personal warmth. Moreover, his military extravaganzas often have the effect of impressing visitors to the point of making them afraid of Cuban military prowess. Raul's direct dogmatism contrasts sharply with Rodriguez' smooth, realistic approach.

25X1 [] As Interior Minister, Sergio del Valle has an important impact on foreign policy even though domestic affairs appear to be his main focus. His ministry is charged with foreign intelligence collection and counterintelligence []

[] Del Valle, a practicing medical doctor before joining Fidel's guerrillas in the Sierra Maestra, was serving as one of Che Guevara's lieutenants when the war against Batista ended. Like many other top Cuban officials, he rose through the ranks of the military establishment and for several years was Raul Castro's deputy. A charter member of the Political Bureau, he was chosen to replace fellow Political Bureau mem-

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ber Ramiro Valdes as interior minister when Fidel was searching for someone to reverse the deterioration in conditions in the ministry-run prison system. (Valdes remained on the Political Bureau and was put in charge of all construction activity in Cuba.) Del Valle proved to be a welcome change from the ruthless Valdes and is generally credited with bringing about a significant improvement in the prisons. Trusted by both Fidel and Raul, he appears to be one of the more moderate members of the leadership.

Party Secretariat

The Secretariat is theoretically the house-keeping organ of the party's Central Committee. When the present party was formed in the fall of 1965 by the merger of Fidel's followers, the old Communist party, and a third political group, the Secretariat was a paper organization because the new party itself was largely a paper organization. It was intended to serve as organizational window dressing for Fidel's dictatorial rule and was the regime's response to critics who complained of a lack of a political structure.

The Secretariat, peopled principally by the same individuals who served on the Political Bureau and headed as usual by Fidel and Raul, actually had little to do. At that time, Fidel approved the appointment of several old Communists to the Secretariat as a sop because he was not yet ready to admit them to the real seat of power—the Political Bureau.

The Cuban Communist Party Secretariat

Fidel Castro, first secretary
 Raul Castro, second secretary
 Blas Roca ("old Communist")
 Carlos Rafael Rodriguez ("old Communist")
 Pedro Miret (ex-guerrilla)
 Jorge Risquet (ex-guerrilla)
 Antonio Perez Herrero (ex-guerrilla)
 Raul Garcia Pelaez (ex-guerrilla)
 Arnaldo Milian ("old Communist")

With the beginning of the institutionalization process in the early 1970s, however, new life was breathed into the Secretariat: new personnel were added, and members were given substantial responsibility for specific tasks relating to the party, government, or society. To enable him to carry out his functions, each Secretariat member was put in charge of one or more Central Committee departments, which were created to formulate policy, present policy options to the Political Bureau, relay the Political Bureau's decisions to the appropriate party or government offices, and monitor the progress of the policy as it was implemented.

Changes in the Secretariat were made at the first party congress in 1975 in an effort to reflect the revamping that had taken place in the previous five years. For the first time, since the 1962 power struggle, the "old Communists" assumed positions of importance in the party structure, paralleling the increased influence of Moscow in Cuba's foreign and domestic affairs. The Secretariat's membership was reduced to nine, and the appointment of one of its members, Malmierca, to head the Foreign Ministry temporarily reduced it to eight. The appointment of Milian restored it to nine. Again Fidel, Raul, and Rodriguez are the primary figures involved in foreign affairs.

Another Secretariat member, Raul Garcia Pelaez, is concerned with foreign policy in his role of liaison with other Communist parties. He served for years as Castro's ambassador in Moscow and most likely is consulted on Cuba's Soviet policy. He and his brother Pedro served with Fidel during the guerrilla war; Pedro, like his brother, is a Central Committee member. Pedro is also chief of one of Cuba's three armies, and a veteran of Angola.

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As the Secretariat's ideological watchdog, Antonio Perez Herrero is also involved in foreign policy. A close associate of Raul Castro since the 1950s, he is responsible for ensuring that Cuban ideological teachings do not stray too far from those of Moscow. He also heads the apparatus that coordinates Cuban propaganda with Soviet propaganda. He is typical of the faction in the leadership that sees things only in terms of extremes. During his reign as vice minister and chief political officer of the armed forces, he initiated a campaign of repression of Cuban intellectuals—pre-empting the party in what was basically a political, not military, matter.

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"Old Communist" Blas Roca, who now is on both the Secretariat and the Political Bureau, probably offers foreign policy advice to Fidel in support of Carlos Rafael Rodriguez, but he does not appear to be a major contributor to foreign policy decisions. His main responsibility appears to be in the field of law; he was the principal drafter of the new Cuban constitution and the architect of the electoral system adopted last year for local, provincial, and national assemblies. From time to time, he also receives the credentials of foreign diplomats as Fidel's designee on the Council of State; he is also president of the National Assembly.

Party Central Committee Departments

Of the numerous departments of the Central Committee, three are involved primarily with foreign affairs: the General Department of Foreign Relations headed by "old Communist" Raul Valdes Vivo; the America Department headed by Manuel Pineiro Losada, better known as Barba Roja (Red Beard); and the Africa - Middle East Department headed by Osmany Cienfuegos Gorriaran. Little is known of the functioning of the departments or even their subordination. Under the jurisdiction of the Secretariat, they could be the responsibility of Rodriguez or, more likely, they could be under Fidel himself. Valdes Vivo would probably have no problem working under Rodriguez, but Cienfuegos and Pineiro, particularly the latter, are very close to Fidel and would probably find subordination to Rodriguez unbearable. Both appear to have direct access to Fidel.

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Pineiro and Cienfuegos have long been involved in foreign affairs, both having been kingpins in Cuba's subversive apparatus of the 1960s. As a vice minister, Pineiro headed the Interior Ministry's General Directorate of Intelligence (DGI), which planned, directed, and executed the subversive operations in Africa



Osmany Cienfuegos Gorriaran



Raul Valdes Vivo



Manuel Pineiro Losada

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and Latin America for which the Castro regime became so well known. Cienfuegos, on the other hand, was named head of the Asian, African, and Latin American People's Solidarity Organization (AALAPSO), an umbrella organization founded in Havana in January 1966 to link leftist and Communist governments with revolutionary movements throughout the world.

With the failure in October 1967 of the DGI's most spectacular operation headed by Che Guevara in Bolivia, a gradual de-emphasis of the "armed struggle" philosophy took place in Havana. Pineiro, whose penchant for violent revolution had caused serious problems between Havana and Moscow, left the DGI, and Cienfuegos' AALAPSO shrank to little more than a paper organization useful only for an occasional propaganda release. With the restructuring of the party in the early 1970s, however, both reappeared heading their respective party departments.

Less is known of the workings and personnel of the Africa - Middle East Department, but it presumably functions in much the same fashion as the America Department. Cienfuegos travels frequently to Africa to meet with top leaders and has first hand knowledge of the situations in virtually all of sub-Sahara African countries and many of the Arab countries as well. He was once a member of the youth wing of the pre-Castro Communist party and thus is ostensibly eligible for characterization as an old Communist; he apparently broke party discipline to join Castro's revolutionary movement during the guerrilla war, however, and this would give him favorable standing among the former guerrillas.

Whereas Pineiro is openly identified as chief of the America Department, Cienfuegos is invariably identified as secretary of the Council of Ministers and of its executive committee. This is basically a housekeeping job for the leadership of the Council of Ministers, but it links Cienfuegos closely to Fidel. It is common for members of the Cuban leadership to hold two positions, one in the party and the other in the government.

Where possible, department personnel travel frequently to their areas of responsibility, establish personal contact with key local party and government officials, develop links with opposition leaders, and serve as contacts when any of these people visit Cuba. Where travel is inopportune—such as in Chile, Nicaragua, Guatemala, Paraguay, and Uruguay—department personnel work with exiles and with local opposition groups and revolutionary movements. They thus are well briefed on events and personalities in their areas of responsibility and are well qualified to formulate policy and explain policy options to the Political Bureau.

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25X1 [] Valdes Vivo is a relative newcomer to the party hierarchy, having gained membership in the Central Committee only in December 1975. He, nevertheless, has had extensive experience in foreign affairs. He traveled widely as a journalist for the official Cuban press agency and served under trying conditions as Cuba's ambassador to North Vietnam, Cambodia, and the Provisional Revolutionary Government of South Vietnam. He was present in Luanda to cover the trial of the foreign mercenaries in 1976 and wrote a book on the event that was widely circulated by Havana. In a previous book, he described his experiences in Vietnam. An old Communist, he is probably linked closely with Carlos Rafael Rodriguez.

25X1 [] Other departments of the Central Committee no doubt are drawn into foreign policy from time to time but none is so involved on a continuing basis as are the three already mentioned. The Military Department under Brigadier General Calixto Garcia, for example, probably has had such a role as Cuban military intervention has escalated in recent years. There is no evidence, however, that ex-guerrilla Garcia—nor any of the remaining department chiefs—has been a key factor in foreign policy decisions.

Council of State

25X1 [] The Council of State and its subordinate Council of Ministers become involved in the execution rather than the formulation or determination of foreign policy. Fidel and Raul Castro are president and first vice president, respectively, of both, and all Political Bureau members have seats on the Council of State. With one exception, the lesser members of these two governing bodies have an impact on foreign policy decisions only to the extent that they advise the leadership of the capability of their respective offices to carry out tasks in support of those decisions.

Fishing Industry Minister Anibal Velaz, for example, advises on his ministry's ability to cooperate with and provide technical and material assistance to foreign countries; at times

he even conducts negotiations arranging for such Cuban support with foreign officials, but he does so under policy limitations laid down by the Political Bureau. Similarly, Hector Rodriguez Llompart as chief of the State Committee for Economic Cooperation handles a broad range of Cuban assistance to other countries as well as foreign assistance to Cuba, but he is basically an executor of policy. Even the foreign minister, Isidoro Malmierca, is in this category.

The one exception is Food Industry Minister Jose Naranjo. Despite his title, Naranjo apparently has little to do with the food industry. Instead, he spends virtually all his time with Fidel. When Castro is seen in public, Naranjo is usually close by, and when Castro travels, either within Cuba or abroad, Naranjo invariably goes with him.

[] He clearly is very close to Fidel and may well influence him on both domestic and foreign policy matters. On the other hand, he may be Castro's constant companion simply because of his congeniality and may have no more impact on policy than serving as a sounding board for Castro's musings.

With the creation of the Council of State in December 1976, the Council of Ministers was reduced in importance. Until that time, it had been the highest administrative and executive body of the state. It had expanded enormously, however, and had finally become too unwieldy to carry out its functions efficiently. As a temporary remedial measure, an executive committee of the Council of Ministers was formed in 1972 composed of Fidel, Raul, and eight other top officials who were placed in charge of eight broad areas of government called sectors. The functions of the sector chiefs are now performed by the eight vice presidents of the Council of Ministers. No personnel changes occurred; the same eight men merely have new titles.

Last December, a new constitution was adopted that subordinated this refined structure to an indirectly elected legislature called the

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[redacted] National People's Assembly. As the new "supreme organ of state power," the National People's Assembly is limited in the field of foreign affairs to "approving the general outlines of foreign policy," according to the constitution. In the only Assembly session held so far, this "approval" apparently consisted of the applause that greeted Fidel's 13-hour reading of the General Report. Castro clearly has no intention of letting the Assembly pre-empt any of his authority.

Enterprise helped to consolidate Havana's relations with South Yemen.

Great investments are made in the field of sports, first to select and develop the country's most outstanding athletes, and second to use these athletes' victories in international competition as proof of the superiority of the Cuban political system and way of life. Even the Cuban mass organizations promote foreign policy goals. Several supply friendly governments with experienced organizers to help them develop a broad base of popular support through the creation of their own mass organizations.

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The Council of State functions in the Assembly's stead when the Assembly is not in session. The Council, therefore, also has the power to "approve the general outline of foreign policy"—a meaningless authority since the entire Political Bureau heads the Council—and to ratify or reject treaties and grant or refuse recognition to foreign diplomats. As for the Council of Ministers, it is empowered by the constitution only to "conduct"—not formulate or determine—foreign policy. These latter two duties are left to the party, which is recognized in Article 5 as "the highest leading force of the society and of the state."

Other Agencies and Offices

Virtually any government entity can be—and is—used for the conduct of Cuban foreign policy. Cubana Airlines and Mambisas Shipping Lines, for example, are used for Cuba's military airlift and sealift to Angola in support of President Neto's Popular Movement.

The Federation of Cuban Women has established ties with numerous women's groups in Latin America, the Caribbean, and Africa to foster strongly politicized national women's federations. The National Association of Small Farm Owners has done the same with the peasantry of several countries, mainly in Latin America. The Young Communist League, the party's youth arm, appears to be particularly active in African countries helping to organize and politicize students and youth in general. Officials of the Committees for the Defense of the Revolution, most likely in conjunction with the Armed Forces and Interior Ministries, are helping to form and train militias in several African countries.

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[redacted] The Ministries of Public Health, Interior, Education, Construction, Armed Forces, Sugar Industry, Fishing Industry, and Foreign Trade are all used to channel aid to foreign countries for political purposes. The first advances in Cuban influence in Equatorial Guinea, for example, were made through the Cuban Forestry Institute, while the National Poultry

Various Cuban educational institutions are also deeply involved in foreign policy. Students from a wide range of countries, from Vietnam to Congo, have been granted admission to the University of Havana, for example, for medical training and other courses, and many Cuban technical schools such as the Andres Gonzalez Lines Advanced Fishing School have opened their doors for would-be technicians from

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abroad. The various schools of the armed forces, presumably including the Maximo Gomez War College, also enroll foreign students and trainees.

Cultural institutions are not exempt from pursuing foreign policy goals. The prestigious Casa de las Americas literary and artistic organization in Havana headed by a member of the Central Committee and Council of State holds annual contests and awards coveted prizes for several categories of literary works by Latin American authors, poets, and playwrights. After the party decided to focus hemispheric policy efforts on the Caribbean, the Casa expanded its contests to include entrants from the English-speaking countries. Noted figures in the Cuban cultural world, such as poet Nicolas Guillen and prima ballerina Alicia Alonso, are sent abroad to bolster Cuba's prestige while others, such as Alejo Carpentier and Fayad Jamis, are assigned to strategic Cuban embassies as cultural attaches to promote Cuban policy in foreign artistic communities. Even a few carefully selected officials of various church groups in Cuba are sent abroad.

Conclusions

In Cuba, foreign policy options are debated by a small clique of officials at the very top of the party structure, with final decisions left to Fidel Castro. For years, Castro acted arbitrarily in exercising the power of decision, but since the late 1960s he appears to have been paying greater heed to advice from others in the leadership, particularly those with traditional links to Moscow. Friction between Moscow and Havana still exists, but it is not so intense and its fluctuations are less pronounced. While Havana may frequently get out ahead of Moscow on foreign policy matters, the Castro regime is much less likely now to adopt a policy that is on a collision course with Soviet policy.

This trend toward closer collaboration with Moscow does not negate the possibility of the adoption of radical policies on matters that Fidel considers of great importance to Cuba. For example, he continues to align Cuba with

the radical element in the nonaligned movement, because a more pragmatic stance—despite its benefits—would leave him vulnerable to accusations of having made an accommodation with “imperialism” and having abandoned the cause of revolutionaries around the world.

In his decisionmaking responsibilities he is subject to pressures from two key groups in the leadership—his former comrades-in-arms and the pre-Castro Communists—and also from a third group, the technocrats, which is gaining strength and influence as its role in the economy expands. Although the ex-guerrillas are by far the strongest faction, their views do not always predominate. Castro's belated support for the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968, for example, was the “old Communist” faction's first major foreign policy victory over the ex-guerrillas. Although these victories have increased and the trend is likely to continue, the “old Communists” are unlikely to develop sufficient power to threaten the domination of Fidel Castro and his brother Raul.

Castro is also subject to pressure from Cuban public opinion, and this may confront him with his most serious political problem since 1970 should Angola turn into Cuba's Vietnam. Very serious economic problems caused by a combination of factors apparently are perceived by the public—whether accurately or not is immaterial—to be stemming from Cuban foreign assistance programs, particularly the one for Angola. Continued mobilizations for Angola, a persistent casualty drain, increased government mismanagement, and greater austerity measures seem to be inevitable and unquestionably will be unpopular. Castro's problems will be compounded should Cuba be drawn into a substantial military involvement in some other country such as Ethiopia.

Because of the nature of the foreign policy apparatus Castro has forged, Cuba is committed to a policy that is based more on idealism than realism. Its lack of flexibility bodes ill for Cuba as well as for the countries that have to deal with Cuba.

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*The author of this paper is [REDACTED]
Latin America Division, Office of Regional
and Political Analysis. Comments and queries
are welcome and should be directed to Mr.*

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Cuba's Foreign Policy
Apparatus and How It
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KP 999-10164

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. Robert Pastor
NSC Staff Chief for Latin America

I believe you will find the attached memorandum informative and useful. It is not just a primer on the Cuban foreign policy making apparatus, but contains a number of analytical judgments about how and why the Cubans view the world the way they do. It also contains political insights into the personalities of the key officials. If you have time, I would appreciate receiving any comments you might have to offer, particularly if you perceive any errors in judgment.

[Redacted]

Chief, Latin America Division
Office of Regional & Political
Analysis

[Redacted]

Date 15 July 1977

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MEMORANDUM FOR: Assistant Secretary
Terence Todman

I believe you will find the attached memorandum informative and useful. It is not just a primer on the Cuban foreign policy making apparatus, but contains a number of analytical judgments about how and why the Cubans view the world the way they do. It also contains political insights into the personalities of the key officials. If you have time, I would appreciate receiving any comments you might have to offer, particularly if you perceive any errors in judgment.

[Redacted]

Chief, Latin America Division
Office of Regional & Political
Analysis

[Redacted]

#36

Date 15 July 1977

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MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. Richard Arellano
Deputy Assistant Secretary for
Inter-American Affairs

I believe you will find the attached memorandum informative and useful. It is not just a primer on the Cuban foreign policy making apparatus, but contains a number of analytical judgments about how and why the Cubans view the world the way they do. It also contains political insights into the personalities of the key officials. If you have time, I would appreciate receiving any comments you might have to offer, particularly if you perceive any errors in judgment.

[Redacted]
Chief, Latin America Division
Office of Regional & Political
Analysis
[Redacted]

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Date 15 July 1977

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MEMORANDUM FOR: Culver Glysteen
Chief/CCO/ARA

I believe you will find the attached memorandum informative and useful. It is not just a primer on the Cuban foreign policy making apparatus, but contains a number of analytical judgments about how and why the Cubans view the world the way they do. It also contains political insights into the personalities of the key officials. If you have time, I would appreciate receiving any comments you might have to offer, particularly if you perceive any errors in judgment.

[Redacted]
Chief, Latin America Division
Office of Regional & Political
Analysis

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#38

Date 15 July 1977

MEMORANDUM FOR: Major General Richard E. Cavazos
C/ISA/LA

I believe you will find the attached memorandum informative and useful. It is not just a primer on the Cuban foreign policy making apparatus, but contains a number of analytical judgments about how and why the Cubans view the world the way they do. It also contains political insights into the personalities of the key officials. If you have time, I would appreciate receiving any comments you might have to offer, particularly if you perceive any errors in judgment.

[REDACTED]
Chief, Latin America Division
Office of Regional & Political
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Date 15 July 1977

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